



FIGHTING ONLINE
ANTISEMITISM

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ANNUAL REPORT

2025

CONTENTS

Letter from the CEO: The Year Antisemitism Became Normal 3
Executive Summary: Key Achievements in 2025 4

Chapter I: Data and Analysis 4
Content Removed by Direct Channels and FOA's Volunteers 4
Content Removed by FOA's Direct Channels: 2024 vs. 2025 5
Monitored Content by Type of Antisemitism 6
Top Hashtags and Keywords 8

Chapter II: 10 Trends in Online Antisemitism 9
USA: The 'Nova Now' Terror Plot 9
Australia: Bondi Hanukkah Shooting and Ensuing Online Conspiracies 10
UK: "Death to the IDF" 11
Washington, D.C. Murders (May 21, 2025) 12
The Israel–Iran War 13
Following October 7: Hostages Targeted Online 14
The Starvation Narrative: Antisemitic Tropes in Gaza Social Media Campaigns 15
UK: Manchester Synagogue Attack 16
USA: Charlie Kirk's Assassination 17
Cyprus: Deepfakes Promoting Conspiracy Theories 18

Chapter III: FOA's International Community of Volunteers and Global Advocacy19
Global and Cross-Regional Educational and Training Partnerships..... 19
North America 19
Europe 19
Israel 20
Research 20

Letter from the CEO: The Year Antisemitism Became Normal

In 2025, online antisemitism did not represent a turning point or a slowdown; rather, it continued to exist and became normalized within mainstream digital discourse. Antisemitism became a constant presence online, appearing across trending platforms and narratives until it blended into the background of digital life. Global events repeatedly triggered waves of conspiracy theories within hours, yet the most significant danger was the transition from digital incitement to real-world violence. This reality was tragically evidenced by physical attacks and threats in cities like Manchester, Washington, D.C., and Sydney.

In response to these challenges, FOA reached substantial milestones that strengthened the resilience of Jewish communities. We brought about a significant increase in the removal of harmful content on major social media platforms through professional escalation and direct reporting channels. We launched a dedicated monitoring project in collaboration with the Australian community to identify threats in real time and developed innovative online guides that provide practical tools to combat antisemitism. Furthermore, we trained more than 500 volunteers globally and expanded strategic partnerships with technology companies and civil society organizations.

In 2025, our operational expansion centered on the significant advancement of our research and reporting infrastructure. We transitioned to a model of publishing comprehensive monthly reports that analyze emerging trends and provide actionable data for both policymakers and community leaders. The weaponization of emerging technologies emerged as a defining feature of the year. FOA documented a sharp rise in AI generated disinformation and deepfakes, particularly during the war with Iran in June. These materials blurred the line between reality and fabrication while eroding public trust in authentic evidence, allowing antisemitic narratives to flourish under the claim that all information is fabricated. This trend marked a dangerous evolution from volume based hate to the strategic manipulation of perception and emotion.

Looking ahead to 2026, we intend to transform our volunteer network into an active intelligence shield that protects Jewish, Israeli and innocent lives. Our primary objective is to train more than 600 new volunteers as part of a global task force. A special emphasis will be placed on utilizing OSINT techniques to detect incitement to violence and intercept planned attacks before they occur. Through close collaboration with Jewish communities and continued technological innovation, we will ensure that the fight against online antisemitism leads to tangible results and enhanced public safety.



Tomer Aldubi

Founder and Executive Director

Executive Summary: Key Achievements in 2025

In 2025, FOA reported 35,700 antisemitic items and achieved an average removal rate of 67% across the 5 leading platforms when reporting directly to the platforms, compared with 35% for FOA's volunteer reports.

FOA encountered a continued escalation in the scale and intensity of online antisemitism and significantly increased the removal of antisemitic content across major platforms. The consistent success appeals process further demonstrated the critical importance of professional reporting in enforcing platform policies and mitigating harm.

FOA's monitoring data showed a substantial increase in the overall volume of harmful content, alongside a marked rise in its most dangerous forms. Alongside this quantitative rise in hate content, FOA documented the emergence of a sharp surge in AI-generated deepfakes, particularly during the June 2025 Israel–Iran war, while coordinated disinformation campaigns amplified antisemitic narratives. These trends represent the increasing weaponization of technology to manipulate perception.

At the core of these efforts stands our expanding international volunteer community. **Our 500 volunteers community is multi-generational, with nearly half of the volunteers aged 18-30, hailing from 27 countries, allowing us to monitor in various languages.**

FOA successfully identified and facilitated **the disruption of a high-level terror plot orchestrated by a white nationalist accelerationist cell.** The group explicitly planned to target U.S. Jewish communities on April 1, 2026, the first night of Passover, with the stated intent to "bring the Nova massacre home." By monitoring operational discussions on X that detailed specific weaponry and holiday gathering targets, FOA's intelligence unit compiled a comprehensive evidentiary file. This intelligence was transitioned to the FBI's Detroit Field Office Hate Crimes Division, triggering a formal federal investigation and neutralizing a direct threat to public safety.

Beyond immediate threat mitigation, FOA maintained a strategic focus on the "Convergence of Extremes" through continuous monitoring of the digital landscape. This effort led to the extensive documentation of antisemitic activity on UpScrolled, a social platform launched in mid 2025. Following a systematic analysis of the platform's systemic failure to enforce community guidelines, FOA formally reported UpScrolled to Apple and Google for significant app store policy violations, which led Google to open an investigation. This proactive approach ensures that emerging digital spaces are held accountable to global safety standards while providing a clear intelligence picture of evolving extremist coordination.

Chapter I: Data and Analysis


Content Removed by Direct Channels and FOA's Volunteers

In 2025, FOA significantly increased content removals in 2025 compared to 2024, from 67% in 2025 compared to 53% in 2024, and 35% of volunteers report compared to 28% in 2024. Most of the content was monitored in English, Russian, French, Spanish, Arabic, and German.

This quantitative rise highlights the growing impact of FOA's early intervention strategies and direct escalation channels with social media platforms. In 2025, FOA's direct escalation channels consistently removed far more antisemitic content than individual reporting across every major platform, showing that trained intervention, not volume alone, is what stops online incitement from spreading.

The comparison between FOA's professional removal percentage and standard volunteer (user) removal rates in 2025 shows that NGO reporting is significantly more effective than individual reporting of content across all platforms. In addition, FOA expanded its research and investigations into platform policies throughout 2025. These efforts enhanced our use of escalation channels, resulting in a significantly higher content removal rate

and a total increase of 14% compared to previous years. On the one hand, this demonstrates the importance of FOA as a partner flagger by the platforms. On the other hand, it highlights the “preferential treatment” given to FOA as an NGO, where a report of hateful material made by a volunteer as an individual is less likely to be removed than a report made by the same volunteer through FOA.




On TikTok, FOA's specialized escalation channels achieved an approximately 85% success rate, while standard volunteer reports reached roughly 35%. Similar trends were observed across FOA, which achieved a 62% removal rate, compared with 32% for volunteers who submitted complaints individually, and on YouTube, FOA achieved 60%, compared with roughly 22%. On X, professional reports were successful roughly 48% of the time, whereas volunteer reports were successful in 18% of cases.

In several cases, content initially rejected by platforms was successfully removed following persistent appeals, underscoring the importance of professional, evidence-based engagement.

Content Removed by FOA’s Direct Channels: 2024 vs. 2025

The chart illustrating removal rates across these social media platforms reveals progress on every monitored site between 2024 and 2025.



Monitored Content by Type of Antisemitism


FOA's monitoring data from 2025 shows not only a quantitative rise in antisemitic content, but a qualitative escalation. Calls for violence, glorification of terror, and direct threats became more explicit, particularly during periods of geopolitical tension.

Over the past year, these threats of violence have become a larger and more frequent part of the digital discourse.

In 2024, inciting material accounted for 13% of all monitored content. By 2025, that figure had climbed to over 17%. The volume of documented incitement increased by nearly a third in one year, indicating that the internet is becoming a more hostile and dangerous environment.




Incitement to violence
X, November 2025, removed



Glorification of violence -
 another form of incitement
X, June 2025, removed

The 2025 distribution for monitored hate content—representing the average across major social media platforms including Meta, X, TikTok, and YouTube—shows that classic antisemitic narratives remain the primary category at 33%. This is followed by the incitement or glorification of violence at 22%. Both supporting terrorism and anti-Israeli/anti-Zionist content account for 15% of detected material each, while Holocaust denial and false or fake information represent 11% and 5% of the distribution, respectively.

This data illustrates that while traditional tropes remain dominant, explicit calls for violence represent an alarming and substantial portion of online hate speech.




The murder of Shiri Bibas and her two young children, Ariel and Kfir, is one of the most horrifying incidents of Hamas's cruelty. The confirmation that a mother and her babies were killed by their captors shocked people around the world. On social media, users shared content that went far beyond political debate. Posts and memes mocked the murdered children and even praised the violence. The suffering of an innocent family was stripped of humanity and turned into material for hatred and incitement.



X, March 2025, removed

Throughout 2025, FOA placed significant emphasis on locating and removing harmful comments, removing over 1,000 comments. The antisemitic comments are frequent under pro-Israeli content, they are also highly prevalent in the comment sections of biased news outlets such as the BBC and Al Jazeera. By focusing specifically on these discussion threads, FOA was able to target these comments more effectively. These comments were collected during October and December 2025. All these comments have since been removed.





Top Hashtags and Keywords

FOA monitors and documents the hashtags and keywords used during their content searches and in the aggregated content. We compiled a list of the most frequently used hashtags and keywords.

A notable finding is the use of alternative spellings to evade social media platforms' algorithmic moderation systems. For instance, terms like "J*ws" or "j€ws" are deliberately misspelled to evade detection, demonstrating the adaptive methods used to avoid automated moderation filters. For further insight, a compiled list of the Top 20 Hashtags is available below. The following hashtags reflect prevalent trends of content and keyword usage:




Chapter II: 10 Trends in Online Antisemitism

USA: The 'Nova Now' Terror Plot

From late December 2025 through January 2026, FOA stopped a domestic terror plot in the U.S. that showed how quickly online antisemitic talk can turn into real planning. By closely monitoring activity on X, FOA found a series of extremist threads in which a white nationalist group used the slogan "Nova Now" to signal plans to repeat the Nova massacre in the U.S. The group planned a mass-casualty attack for April 1, 2026, the first night of Passover, and aimed to target Jewish families.

The investigation revealed a clear shift from general hate speech to specific plans. Members referred to the October 7th attacks as a "blueprint" and discussed using knives for close-range attacks instead of guns. FOA gathered strong evidence, including digital fingerprints linked to the leaders, and provided it directly to the FBI's Detroit Field Office. The plot was part of a rise in holiday-related terror threats in Michigan, following a thwarted "Pumpkin Day" plot in late 2025 and a New Year's Eve threat in early 2026. This case clearly shows how online antisemitism and extremism can quickly become a real and deadly danger to the Jewish community.





Australia: Bondi Hanukkah Shooting and Ensuing Online Conspiracies

On December 14, 2025, during a public Hanukkah menorah lighting ceremony on Bondi Beach in Sydney, Australia, two gunmen—Sajid Akram (50) and his son, Naveed Akram (24), both Australian citizens of Pakistani heritage— opened fire on the crowd.

The attack killed 16 people, including children, and injured over 20 others, making it the deadliest antisemitic incident in Australian history.

Following the attack, conspiracy narratives spread quickly across social media and messaging platforms. False claims circulated alleging that Jews, Israel, or the Mossad were behind the attack, portraying it as a staged “false flag” operation designed to gain international sympathy.

During the same period, we recorded a clear increase in antisemitic misinformation, rising from 3% in November to 7% in December.




X, December 2025, removed

UK: “Death to the IDF”

On social media, the phrase “Death to the IDF” became widely visible after it was coined by the then-little-known punk-rap duo Bob Vylan during their Glastonbury Festival performance on June 28, 2025. Following this exposure, the slogan spread quickly across platforms and led to a clear rise in inciting content. It also triggered an increase in content that combined incitement with explicit antisemitic narratives. Its rapid sharing through posts, videos, and hashtags, and as music on Spotify, increased online harassment, normalized calls for violence, and intensified overall hostility, raising serious concerns about the role of social media in spreading incitement and antisemitism.


Common Hashtag: #deathtotheIDF #deathtotheIOF



Death to the IDF, X, December 2025, not removed

Washington, D.C. Murders (May 21, 2025)

On May 21, 2025, two Israeli Embassy staff members—Yaron Lischinsky (30, cultural attaché) and Sarah Milgrim (26-year-old consular officer)—were shot dead outside the Capital Jewish Museum in Washington, D.C., during a diplomatic reception. The attacker, Elias Rodriguez (29, U.S. citizen with no prior record), approached the victims in the parking lot and opened fire with a handgun, killing both instantly before fleeing. Rodriguez was arrested three hours later after a manhunt; authorities found antisemitic manifestos and pro-Iran propaganda on his devices. On social media platforms, the diplomats were compared to the “baby killing soldiers” and the murderer was often hailed as a hero.




X, May 2025, removed



The Israel–Iran War

In June 2025, during the 12 Day War between Israel and Iran, the military escalation was accompanied by a sharp rise in antisemitic deepfake content across social media platforms. Hostile actors used advanced AI tools to rapidly produce highly realistic antisemitic deepfakes, far faster than fact-checking mechanisms could respond. The scale and speed of this content caused many users to doubt even authentic footage, allowing antisemitic narratives to spread under the claim that real evidence was “fake.”

AI-generated videos falsely showed Israeli cities, infrastructure, and military assets under catastrophic attack. These videos went viral within hours and were designed to provoke fear, while reinforcing antisemitic narratives about Israel and Jews.



TikTok, June 2025, removed

Following October 7: Hostages Targeted Online

Throughout 2025, the war in Gaza remained a major source of global tension. Several hostage release deals brought some captives home, offering moments of relief for families and the public.

At the same time, these events led to a sharp rise in toxic online discourse. Social media became a key space for violent and harmful content, including antisemitic rhetoric and praise for terrorism. Particularly troubling was the increase in direct incitement and the mocking of hostages, as hostile actors used the publicity around the releases to spread dehumanizing messages and deepen social divisions.



Twitter, January 2025, removed

The Starvation Narrative: Antisemitic Tropes in Gaza Social Media Campaigns

Approximately halfway through the year, one of the most damaging false claims against Israel and the Jewish people emerged – that Israel was deliberately blocking humanitarian aid from entering Gaza, thereby creating a man-made famine.

Photos and videos by the thousands flooded social media, and not only that. It became a phenomenon of mass hysteria, to the point that Jews of all nations began to be called “Baby Killers”. Many of these images were the result of deepfake AI, while others were the creations of the Palestinian false information production that has come to be known as “Pallywood”. The old trope of Jews as “Baby Killers” was revived, and even after the worst of the starvation campaign had ended, this horrible slur persisted.




X, July 2025, removed

UK: Manchester Synagogue Attack

On October 2, 2025, during Yom Kippur (the holiest day in Judaism), a terrorist attack targeted the Heaton Park Hebrew Congregation Synagogue in Manchester, UK. The attacker, 35-year-old Jihad Al-Shamie (a British citizen of Syrian descent), drove a car into pedestrians outside the synagogue, injuring several, including a security guard, before exiting and stabbing worshippers in a brief but violent rampage lasting about six minutes.

Al-Shamie called emergency services during the incident to pledge allegiance to the Islamic State (ISIS). The attack left two Jewish men dead and three others seriously wounded. This attack also resulted in online conspiracy theories.



X, October 2025. Blaming the Jews for the Manchester Attack.
Content removed

USA: Charlie Kirk's Assassination

Charlie Kirk, a prominent American conservative activist and political commentator, was assassinated on September 10, 2025, when a lone gunman and Trans activist, Tyler James Robinson, shot him during a public debate on a university campus in Utah, USA.

Within minutes, conspiracy theories began filling the web, the most common of which were #TheMossadDidIt and #TheJewsDidIt, with endless variations.

Charlie's assassination has not only spawned conspiracy theories and hate from the usual keyboard tigers but has also given big names like Candace Owens the chance to exploit this tragedy to further widen their audience and their conspiracy theories (mostly at the expense of the Jewish people). [Gallery](#)



X, September 2025, removed

Cyprus: Deepfakes Promoting Conspiracy Theories

In 2025, a surge in antisemitic rhetoric spread in Cyprus, mainly due to the growing number of Israelis buying property on the island.

The situation escalated during the June congress of AKEL, Cyprus’s second-largest political party, which has a long history of anti-Israel views.

AKEL leader Stefanos Stefanou called Israeli land purchases near sensitive areas a “serious national threat,” warning that Cyprus could “no longer be ours” if action isn’t taken. Beyond the political sphere, antisemitic content spread rapidly across social media platforms, particularly on TikTok, X, and Meta. These deepfakes—primarily circulated on TikTok—falsely claimed that “God promised Cyprus to Jews after Israel” and accused Jews of systematically buying homes, displacing locals, and driving up housing prices.



X, June 2025, removed.

Chapter III: FOA's International Community of Volunteers and Global Advocacy

FOA's mission is made possible by a vibrant, rapidly growing international community of hundreds of volunteers with diverse backgrounds, which forms the backbone of our organization. This is a cross-generational volunteer community in more than 27 countries, monitoring content in multiple languages.

In 2025, we broadened university partnerships, offering students credit-recognized, high-impact volunteering. Students are trained in FOA's unique monitoring methods and contribute to digital threat intelligence, AI analysis, project management, web development, and social media strategy. This flexible online format allows students to combat online antisemitism at their convenience.

Volunteers are primarily from Israel (202), the United States (70), Canada (16), and the United Kingdom (8), with an additional 38 volunteers from 23 other countries. Volunteers aged 18 to 30 now make up nearly half of FOA's monitoring workforce, complemented by experienced professionals and senior volunteers. Together, they provide continuous coverage across time zones, forming the backbone of FOA's reporting, removing content and protecting Jewish lives. This geographic coverage enables FOA to track antisemitic content across time zones and respond quickly to emerging narratives.

Global and Cross-Regional Educational and Training Partnerships

Throughout 2025, cultivating strategic alliances remained a priority to enhance monitoring capabilities, expand educational reach, and influence international policy. By working alongside established leaders in the field, the organization has evolved from a localized monitoring initiative into a central actor in the global effort to secure the digital public sphere.

- Training more than 350 international participants in 12 cycles of the Online Activist Fellowships, supported by the Claims Conference. Participants were trained to identify antisemitism, Holocaust denial, and digital manipulation, as well as to operate effectively within social media reporting systems. The program expanded FOA's geographic and language reach, launching new initiatives for Spanish-speaking communities in Europe and South America.
- Maintaining direct dialogue with major technology companies, including Google and TikTok, allowed for ongoing meetings with the platform's policy teams to discuss policy enforcement and reporting mechanisms. TikTok remained a key partner through its Trusted Flagger program, which has been vital for the rapid removal of inciting content.

North America

- Implementing dedicated community training programs in partnership with the Jewish Federation of Palm Beach County, the Jewish Federation of Greater MetroWest NJ, and the Jewish Federation of Greater Philadelphia. These programs included in-person and virtual trainings, delivered for communities in New Jersey and Miami to strengthen local responses to digital hate.

Europe

- Forming strategic links with EPNA, ENCATE, and the ECJC (European Council of Jewish Communities) to improve coordination among European civil society organizations and streamline reporting mechanisms. Collaborating with these networks enabled them to educate diverse audiences on how to identify and address antisemitism in its various manifestations.
- Concluding the flagship European ERASMUS-funded project, Report Hate!, marking a significant milestone in multinational research and educational cooperation. The project strengthened youth engagement and reporting capacities across multiple European countries.
- Participating in major European policy and advocacy forums included the European Commission Civil

Society Forum in Brussels and the International Conference Against Antisemitism in Berlin. Additional activities included attending the Nordic Network Conference on countering online hate in Scandinavia, participating in a German Police Union event on law enforcement, and contributing to policy discussions hosted by Baroness Luciana Berger in the British Parliament.

Israel

- Establishing prominent institutions with a broad range of leading Israeli academic institutions in 2025, including Reichman University's International School, Ono College, Ariel University, Gordon College of Education, Ben Gurion University, the Hebrew University, the Technion–Israel Institute of Technology, Bar Ilan University, and the Azrieli College of Engineering.
- Partnering with the OCT7 organization to empower digital activists through specialized training in Wikipedia management and Community Notes. Under this initiative, FOA identifies and recruits motivated volunteers, while the OCT7 provides the professional instruction needed to master these influential platforms. This collaboration combines recruitment reach with technical expertise to ensure factual accuracy and digital integrity across global discourse. By equipping volunteers with the tools to provide essential context and transparency, the joint effort creates a robust framework for navigating and improving the quality of online information.
- Participating in the first Sar-El Congress, which strengthened ties between civil society organizations and volunteer-based initiatives.
- Advancing the mission by bringing together diverse stakeholders through the Annual Conference, in partnership with Google, and a special session for social media influencers. These events examined how online narratives spread and how creators can help counter antisemitism while promoting responsible digital engagement.

Research

To support both professionals and the broader public, FOA published a comprehensive series of guides in 2025, each designed as a practical tool for navigating contemporary online hate, covering issues such as Antisemitism & Zionism on Social Media, Antisemitism Visual Guide, 13 Myths for Online Conversations, Zionism 101, and Talking to Kids about Online Antisemitism.

In August, FOA started releasing a monthly report summarizing the collected data, notably identified hashtags and key events, impacting the online antisemitism landscape: [FOA Monthly Reports](#). By combining monitoring data with analysis, FOA's reports identified patterns in online antisemitic content following geopolitical developments, including: [When the Gaza Starvation Campaign Meets Antisemitism](#), [Surge in Online Antisemitism Since the Israel-Iran War](#), [Antisemitism on Gab](#).

Image gallery [here](#)